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How to Try Cases on Board and
Management Liability After a
Financial Crisis
ERIK WERLAUFF: ADVOCATE (SUP. CT.), PROFESSOR, AALBORG UNIVERSITY, DENMARK.*
Since Denmark had not had the principle of the business judgment rule finally confirmed within the financial sector confirmed, a judgment
from the Danish Supreme Court on this matter was anticipated with great anxiety: whether the principle would be confirmed, and if so, how
the further details of the principle would be drawn up.
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not even banks’ boards or managers are to be considered ‘profes-
sional’, but remain under the protection of the ‘business judg-
ment rule’, holds Danish Supreme Court, and rightly so
1. INTRODUCTION
In Denmark, as well as other countries, the courts have had to deal
with judicial reckoning on the field of tort law in regards to the
board members and directors of collapsed banks. As a consequence
of the government seizing control of collapsed banks, almost all of
the civil law trials are proceeded by a special public undertaking,
Finansiel Stabilitet (Financial Stability).
The Danish reckoning generally confirms that also in this field of
tort law – corporate and financial tort liability – traditional tort law
doctrines prevail.
Since Denmark had not had the principle of the business judg-
ment rule finally confirmed within the financial sector confirmed, a
judgment from the Danish Supreme Court on this matter was
anticipated with great anxiety: whether the principle would be
confirmed, and if so, how the further details of the principle would
be drawn up.
The answer is now available, and the business judgment rule – i.e.
the courts’ restraint from trying a management’s business-related
assessments – has been confirmed by the Danish supreme court.
At the same time, it underlines when the business judgment rule
does not apply. This is especially the case in incidences where the
basis for making the business decision has been insufficient, as well
as incidences where irrelevant considerations – e.g. considerations
to members of the board’s personal financial interests – have been
taken into account.
In situations where the business judgment rule does not apply,
contrary to regular tort law, the burden of proof is reversed, and it is
up to the board members concerned to attempt prove that the
interests of the bank were being safeguarded.
With the judgment from the Danish Supreme Court in UfR
2019.1907 H, Capinordic Bank, the so-called ‘business judgment
rule’ was recognized, a rule after which a commercial decision
by the board and management generally would be accepted by
the courts, even though the decision turned out to have caused a
loss.
The most important premises of the judgment can be trans-
formed into a line of questions and – clear and opera-
tive – answers from a unanimous Supreme Court, and the
questions and answers run as follows (in each case with my
added emphasizes).
2. IS THE LIABILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF A BANK
A SHARPENED VARITION OF CULPABILITY?
No, it is the regular culpability that applies, including the possibility
of pleading individual mitigating circumstances, in spite of the fact
that the business of the board in a bank is probably one of the most
regulated, on both EU and national level.
The Supreme Court holds the following:
Of the, then in force, company law Act section 140, § 2, it
appears that board members and directors, who during fulfill-
ment of their office intentionally or negligently have caused
loss to the company, are liable to compensate the loss.
The legislative text which, with minor linguistic adjustments, has
been continued in the company law Act section 361, § 1, 2nd
point, establishes regular culpability. There are not sufficient
grounds in the legislation, or in case law, to determine that a
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3. CAN THE BOARD OF A BANK BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE
ENTIRE COLLAPSE OF THE BANK?
No, there is not a general responsibility for the organization and
operating of the bank; a concrete assessment of the individual
granting of a loan or a guarantee.
The Supreme Court holds:
The Supreme Court does not find it proven that the bank has
been organized and ran in a way which in itself encumbers
liability for [board members B1 og B2] or [director D] for the
losses on the [xx] loan commitments. Whether they can be
determined liable, relies on an assessment of the individual
loan commitments.
4. IS THERE A MARGIN OF ERROR FOR BUSINESS-RELATED
ASSESSMENTS – AND THEREBY A POSSIBILITY FOR AN
ASSESSMENT EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY AND ERRORS OF
ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF A BUSINESS
ASSESSMENT?
Yes, as well as we recognize the margin of assessment within
administrative law, we also recognize a margin of assessment in
business, in which the courts shall not try. This been recognized by
courts in decades in non-financial trials, at least since the judgment
on the Havemann department stores in the 1970s, and it is now
determined that this margin of assessment also applies in liability
cases after the collapse of financial institutions.
The Supreme Court holds the following [my italics]:
A decision to grant a loan relies to a great extent on a business
assessment, primarily based on a credit rating of the borrower. This
assessment must be performed on justifiable grounds. In the credit
rating, it shall be included, among other things, the purpose of the
loan, the borrower’s financial status, the securities/guaranties pro-
vided, as well as the borrower’s ability to run its business, including
the impact of the general financial conjuncture. Which require-
ments need to be set in order for a loan approval to be regarded
justifiable, will rely on an overall assessment in the individual cases.
The Supreme Court holds that courts should show restraint when it
comes to overriding the business assessment made by the bank’s
board and direction in granting a loan.
However, this margin of assessment does not apply in situations
where irrelevant considerations have been at steak, e.g. where loans,
guarantees, etc., have been granted for the gain of a member of the
board or direction or persons related to members.
The Supreme Court holds the following [my emphasize and
addings]:
The same restraint [when contemplating to override the business
assessment] shall not be shown, if it is to be presumed that a
granting of a loan or any other disposition in this regard, has not
solely been made due to business-related considerations of the
bank, but have also included considerations irrelevant to the
operation of the bank. The Supreme Court holds that in these
incidences sharpened requirements must be set, in order to assure
that the interests of the bank have not been breached. In that
regard it must be noted, that in the law of financial activities
section 78, rules have been set up in order to prevent conflicts of
interest in relation to directors and officers.
This is not a matter of strict liability, or any other form of ‘automated’
(objective) liability. Rather, it is a matter of a reversed burden of proof,
contrary to the otherwise straightforward burden of proof in tort law.
The directors or officers in question must prove that they, in spite of
ineligibility, etc., weren’t breaching the interests of the bank.
It might be added that this counter-proof is not per se hopeless
to conduct; in the till now largest Danish case, the EBH Bank Case,
where judgment in the first instance (the Western High Court) was
pronounced on 31 January 2020, two directors (including the
chairman of the board) and the CEO, who were all three personally
interested in a specific loan decision, but failed to inform the other
board members about their personal interest in the case, succeeded
to convinced the high court that the same decision would have been
taken by the board of directors, even if it had been duly informed of
their personal interest in the case, and had been sent outside the
board room during the debate and decision in this case. I was the
lawyer representing the said chairman during all 149 days in court.
5. WHICH POINT IS TIME IS DETERMINATIVE FOR THE COURTS
ASSESSMENT OF JUSTIFIABILITY AND IS THERE A RESPONSIBILITY
TO GATHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IF SUCH IS REQUIRED?
The answer is, that the time of the decision is determinative, and
that it is required, if necessary, to gather additional information for
assessment.
The Supreme Court states the following:
The assessment of whether a granting of a loan has been justifi-
able, must be done on the basis of the informations available at
the time of the granting. Emphasis must be placed on the knowl-
edge available to the individual board member at the time.
Furthermore it is of importance whether the directors or man-
agement––if possible––have made sure that additional necessary
information was being gathered before the loan was granted.
These premises show that hindsight is not relevant, e.g. a subse-
quent financial crisis throwing away all calculations. It is the
knowledge and the basis of the decision present at the time of
granting the loan, that is determinative. If a sensible board member
believed that additional information was required in order to
properly make a decision, such additional information must be
gathered before making the decision.
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6. DOES IT PER SE TRIGGER LIABILITY IF LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, SUCH AS SECTION 70 OR 71 IN THE
DANISH LAW ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES? (LOV OM FINANSIEL
VIRKSOMHED, FIL)
No, actual or potential violations of FIL-provisions regarding the
organization and operation of the bank can be violated without the
per se occurrence of liability. The determining element in the
assessment of liability is a concrete assessment of whether the
granted loan was justifiable or not.
The Supreme Court holds:
Banks are subject to an extensive regulation in the Act of finan-
cial activity. […] In section 70 of the Act, it is required that the
board, in regards to the bank’s most important areas of activities,
must draw up written internal guidelines, outlining the division
of work between the board and management. In section 71,
requirements are established for the board’s general and strategic
functions, as well as requirements for effective types of business
management. Section 71 states that each financial institution
must consider which measures shall be taken in order for the
requirements to be met. The Financial Inspection has described
its practice in relation to section 71 in an instruction.
The legislative provisions in section 70 and 71 in the Act on financial
activities sets requirements to the organizational and operational
aspect of banks. The Supreme Court holds that the provisions do
not possess such a nature that an infringement will per se be sufficient
to consider a director or a manager of a bank liable. As to other
provisions in the financial institution, it will depend on the consid-
erations and purposes of the provisions whether an infringement
could be decisive for a liability for a managing member in a bank.
7. DOES IT PER SE TRIGGER LIABILITY IF THE BANK’S INTERNAL SET
OF RULES HAS BEEN VIOLATED, E.G. THE MANDATORY SECTION 70
INSTRUCTION ABOUT WORK AND COMPETENCE DIVISION
BETWEEN THE BOARD AND MANAGERS?
No, even such violations do not per se trigger a liability. The
determining element in the assessment of liability is and will be a
concrete assessment of whether the granted loan or security was
justifiable or not.
The Supreme Court holds:
The granting power of a bank is vested with the board
which – wholly or partly – within the boundaries of the detailed
framework, can delegate its granting power to managers, cf. the
Act of financial activities section 70. The board establishes the
guidelines for this delegation in the credit instruction, and deter-
mines the guidelines for granting credit for the employees of the
bank in the credit policy. If the managers act contrary to the
credit instruction, or to the credit policy, the individual manager
is responsible towards the board. The board can deviate from its
own guidelines, as well as give permission to deviate from the
guidelines to the extent that such deviation is not violating any
legislation, or otherwise must be considered unjustifiable.
The Supreme Court holds that the circumstances under which a
board deviates from its own guidelines, or accepts a such devia-
tion performed by managers, is not per se liable. Liability will
require that such deviation was unjustifiable, according to a
concrete assessment.
Thus is it also under these circumstances a concrete assessment of
justifiability that is determining for the question of liability. It is the
substance, not the many formalities surrounding it, we must care
about.
8. DOES IT AFFECT THE ASSESSMENT OF LIABILITY THAT THE
AUDITORS OF THE BANK (EXTERNAL AND – IF RELEVANT IN THAT
BANK – INTERNAL) HAVE APPROVED OF THE COMMITMENT, I.E.
JUDGED THAT THERE WERE NO OBJECTIVE INDICATIONS FOR
VALUE ADJUSTMENT (‘OIV’)?
The answer is yes, it does affect the assessment, in the sense that it is
part of the overall assessment of whether the granted loan and/or
security was justifiable. A negative assessment from auditors does
not necessarily mean that liability can be confirmed; and a positive
assessment from the auditors does not necessarily mean that liability
can not be confirmed.
The Supreme Court holds the following:
The Supreme Court sustains that auditors’ assessments of a loan
commitment and the need for depreciation can be part of the
courts’ assessment whether the granting of a loan has been
justifiable.
9. IS THE CEO EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY IF THE BOARD HAS
APPROVED HIS OR HERS RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT A LOAN
OR SECURITY?
No, the manager who recommends an unjustifiable loan will not be
exempt from liability, just because of the board’s approval. The
manager holds an independent responsibility (if necessary in soli-
darity with the approving board members).
The Supreme Court states the following:
In instances where (a manager of a bank) has recommended to
the board the granting of a loan, and where the recommendation
is unjustifiable, the board’s approval does not exempt the the
manager from liability.
So the manager cannot evade liability due to the board’s approval of
his or her recommendation. Whether the individual member of the
board can be held liable or not, depends on an individual assess-
ment of whether the board members decision to approve the
recommendation was unjustifiable.
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10. CAN ONE MAKE A SUMMARIZING EVALUATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF THE BANK BOARD’S AND
MANAGEMENT’S LIABILITY AFTER THE CAPINORDIC-RULING?
Yes you can, namely as follows:
(1) There is no general liability for the board or management, not
even board and management of a financial institution.
Liability must be assessed in relation to each individual grant-
ing of a loan, based on its justifiability – respectively the lack
of such.
(2) Courts should show restraint when judging upon a business
assessment (and even an error of assessment!) made by board
and management of a bank, except in cases where irrelevant
interests of e.g. board members’ own interests have gone into
the assessment. Even then, a strict liability cannot be consti-
tuted, but the burden of proof will be reversed in such situa-
tions: The board member in question must be able to prove
that the interests of the bank was being attended to in the
given decision. The rent ruling from the Western High Court
(31 January 2002) in the EBH Bank case demonstrates, how-
ever, that such counter-proof is possible.
(3) The determining element in the assessment of liability is an
assessment of justifiability of the granted loans (as well as the
justifiability of the basis on which the loans were granted).
(4) A potential violation of formal legislation, internal regulations,
guidelines of the bank etc. is less important in the material
assessment of justifiability. The substance in the case is what
matters (again: justifiability).
These basic principles of the elements of assessment of liability in
financial institutions undoubtedly carries relevance – mutatis
mutandis – to the assessment of liability issues in other types of
professional legal units.
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